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Comments and Casenotes
Felonious Homicide And The Right Of Survivorship
Under Tenancy By The Entireties
By ARNoLD M. WEINER*
The right of survivorship incidental to a tenancy by the
entireties has, at various times, presented legal and equi-
table problems where one tenant has feloniously taken the
life of the other.' Inasmuch as England has abolished this
estate,2 these difficulties are peculiarly American.
In theory, the husband and wife who hold by the entire-
ties are each seized of the entire estate as of the day the
property was first acquired. Upon the death of either, the
other is said to acquire no new property, there merely being
a diminution of persons holding the estate, the survivor
remaining possessed of the same title originally granted.3
* Class of 1957, University of Maryland School of Law; A.B. 1955,
University of Maryland; Casenote Editor, volume XVII.
'The word "murder" has been purposely omitted. This Is because the
problem has arisen in cases of voluntary manslaughter as well as first and
second degree murder. It Is the fact of the felonious homicide in general
which the courts have treated, making no distinction as to the particular
criminal intent behind the homicide. See, for example, the case of Colton
v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122, 80 A. 2d 923 (1951), which dealt with the problem
categorically where the husband was killed by the wife's voluntary man-
slaughter. As to the intent to acquire the property through the death, which
necessarily Implies premeditation and first degree murder, note Professor
Bogert's statement that:
"The question of the killer's Intent In committing his crime should
not be Important In these cases. It is Immaterial whether he killed for
the purpose of getting the property of the deceased or from some other
motive. He has in fact acquired property as a result of a criminal act,
and the Inequity and impolity of letting him retain it exist, even though
he killed in a moment of anger and at once thereafter committed
suicide."
3 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEs (2d ed., 1946), See. 478, 57 et seq. For the
same reason, the word "killer" has been substituted for "murderer", except
where the latter is meant In the technical sense.
2 The Married Women's Property Act of 1882 said that all new convey-
ances, from the date of Its enactment, to husbands and wives created a joint
tenancy In the spouses. The Law of Property Act of 1925 (c. 20) converted
all prior existing tenancies by the entireties into joint tenancies. 20 Hals-
bury's Statutes of England (2d. ed., 1950) ; Real Property (Part I) Sch. I,
Part VI, 869.
h "Estates by the entireties are creatures of the common law created by
legal fiction and based wholly on the common-law doctrine that husband
and wife are one, and, therefore, there is but one estate and, In con-
templation of law, but one person owning the whole."
4 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY (1940), See. 1803, 330.
"The Interest of one spouse may ripen into a fee simple upon the
death of the other, but It Is the conveyance to both of them and not the
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Applying this concept to the situation in which one tenant
kills the other, the courts have held that no new legal
benefit accrues to the killer as a result of his felonious act,
and that the legal title remains unaffected. Attempts by
personal representatives and heirs of the victim-spouse to
have the legal title declared vested in them as a result of
the homicide, have therefore been futile.
The first case in which such a result was unsuccessfully
urged to the courts was Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman.4
An action was brought in equity by the heirs of the victim
to have a conveyance by the killer declared void as a cloud
on their title, and to declare legal title in them. The
Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed the complaint, and
speaking of the killer, said:
"The title which he claimed was acquired and vested
in him by the conveyances made to him and his wife
previous to her death, and he did not attempt to convey
anything acquired through or under her. Where land
is conveyed to husband and wife to hold by entirety,
the survivor, upon the death of the other, takes and
becomes vested of the entire estate - a fee-simple
estate - by virtue of the grant or deed conveying the
property to them; the interest of the deceased being
terminated by his or her death. This is an ancient,
familiar, and well-established doctrine of the common
law, and enforced in this and all of the other states of
the Union, so far as we are informed."5
Without any protracted discussion, the court also ruled that
complainant's desired relief violated the Tennessee consti-
tutional provision against forfeiture of property worked by
conviction of crime.'
death of either that creates the estate which ripens Into the fee simple
so that death Is not the source of title."
Op. cit., ibid, Sec. 1803, 332. For the same general statement, see 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1939), Sec. 430, 217' et 8eq. See also Stieff Co. v.
Ulirich, 110 Md. 629, 73 A. 874 (1909), where, at page 634, the Court said:
"There can be no doubt of the proposition that on the date of the
recording of the deed the title to the entire property vested In the wife
subject to be divested, in the event of her prior death, in favor of her
husband. A tenancy by the entireties Is in the eye of the law the
tenancy of one person, and each is seized of the whole."
The Married Women's Property Act [Md. Code (1951), Art. 45, Secs. 1, 21
in this state has not destroyed the essential character of the tenancy, i.e.,
each take the entirety and neither a moiety. Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402
(1878) ; Masterman v. Masterman, 129 Md. 167, 98 A. 537 (1916).
'118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 108 (1907).
'Ibid, 109 et seq.
'TENN. CONST., Art. 1, Sec. 12 [1 Tenn. Code Ann. (Off. Ed. 1956) 305].
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In Wenker v. Landon7 and Hamer v. Kinnan,8 Oregon
and Pennsylvania, respectively, followed the Beddingfield
principle, and, in actions of ejectment, declared that the
legal title was in the killer.' The Wenker case reiterated,
again without discussion, the belief that the extinguishment
of the killer's legal title would run counter to a constitu-
tional provision against forfeiture of property worked by
conviction. 0
In 1918, however, a New York lawyer came into equity
and asked that a constructive trust be imposed upon the
killer's legal estate for the benefit of his wife's heirs.
The court, in a per curiam opinion, granted the requested
relief." From that time on, heirs of a victim-spouse had a
convenient weapon with which the killer's right of sur-
vivorship could be attacked, but the courts' reaction to the
use of the constructive trust device under these circum-
stances has varied. There are four basic attitudes which
the courts have taken toward the problem. Some have
denied the trust entirely; some have imposed the trust on
half of the property; some have imposed the trust upon
the entire property (with or without allowance for the
husband's income during his life); and still others have im-
posed the trust in varying degrees, dependent upon the life
expectancies of the killer and the victim. 2 This wide dif-
ference of opinion has been brought about by varying an-
swers to the following questions: (1) Can a court, even one
of equity, work changes in the rules of property survivor-
ship without the authority of a statute? (2) Does tamper-
ing with the common law rights of survivorship in cases
such as these violate constitutional or statutory provisions
' 161 Ore. 265, 88 P. 2d 971 (1939).8 16 Pa. D & C 395 (1931).
9 These seem to be the only three cases in which the legal title was
assailed.
10 Supra, n. 7, 974. "No conviction shall work corruption of blood or for-
feiture of estate." ORx. CONST., Art. 1, See. 25 [9 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann.
(1940) 1391.
U Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. Rep. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918). The
fact of the constructive trust was a bit obscured by the court's speaking in
terms of injunction. But see 4 ScoTT, TnnsTs (2d ed., 1956), See. 493.2, 3206.
2 Professor Scott has classified the cases differently. He does not con-
sider the cases in which the trust was imposed on a life expectancy basis
as a separate class, but has made a class distinction between the impression
of the trust upon the entire estate with allowance for income to the killer
and the imposition of the trust on the entire estate without allowance for
income. So, on a different basis, he has also arrived at a four-way classifl-
cation. ScOTT, op. cit., ibid, n. 11, 3204 et seq. Professor Pomeroy viewed
the problem as simply one of equity imposing a constructive trust upon
the property or not, a dichotomy. 4 POMEOY, EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE (5th
ed., 1941), Sec. 1054d, 128. See also the recent, though inadequate, annota-
tion in 32 A. L. R. 2d 1099, 1102.
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against forfeiture of estate for conviction of crime? (3)
Assuming that these first two barriers have been overcome,
on what basis can a fair adjustment of the rights of the
parties be had?
No CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IMPOSED
The Pennsylvania and Indiana courts have refused to
apply the constructive trust at all, the latter court reaching
its decision in the case of National City Bank of Evansville
v. Bledsoe" just last year. The difficulty occasioned by
these courts is that they have declared themselves impotent
to reach results based upon public policy, because no initial
authority to apply the trust could be found. Referring to
the cases in which the courts have aided the heirs of the
victim, it was said in the Bledsoe case:
"We are of the opinion that in those cases the courts
have, in their zeal to achieve a result, invaded and
usurped the functions of the legislative branch of gov-
ernment." . . . [and in the next paragraph] . . . "The
question before us involves a matter of public policy."' 4
In Wyckoff v. Clark,5 the killer contracted to convey
the property away. When the purchaser refused to per-
form, the killer brought an action for specific performance,
and the defendant answered that the bill should be dis-
missed and a constructive trust imposed upon the property
for the benefit of the victim's heirs. The Pennsylvania court
decreed specific performance, dismissing defendant's con-
tentions. In justification of the court's inability to create
the trust as an equitable exception to the right of survivor-
ship, the Pennsylvania court cited, as controlling authority,
an earlier case which had refused to deny a parricide his
133 N. E. 2d 887 (Ind., 1956) ; dis. op. 894.1
"Ibid, 892. The case was decided by a 4-2 court, and on p. 895 the dissent
eloquently voiced its objection:
"Without further discussion, I do not believe that our courts should
add murder as an approved method of terminating tenancy by entireties
in view of the issue presented to the court in this case."
15 77 Pa. D & C 249 (1951). This was the first case ever to deny the con-
structive trust altogether. It was perhaps made easier by the fact that the
court knew that It was not creating a binding precedent of any conse-
quence. The spouses had had the property conveyed to them in 1895. In
1941 the Pennsylvania Legislature had passed the Slayer's Act which Im-
poses the constructive trust upon the entire property except for one-half the
income for the killer's life. Pa. L. (1941) 816, Sec. 5. Purdon's Pa. Stats.
Ann. (1955 Supp.), Tit. 20, Sec. 3445. The court held that the Slayer's Act
does not operate retroactively and only applies to conveyances made after
the statute's effective date, regardless of when the killing was.
[VOL. XVII
HOMICIDE AND SURVIVORSHIP
right of inheritance.16 In addition, the court stated, in one
sentence and without authority, that the imposition of the
constructive trust violates the constitutional prohibition
against forfeiture of property worked by conviction of
crime."
TRUST IMPOSED ON HALF THE ESTATE
The trend of the more recent cases, if any trend can be
adduced, appears to be in favor of granting the constructive
trust over one-half the property. Four jurisdictions, in five
cases decided in the last eight years, have granted this re-
lief. Those states are Missouri, Kentucky, Florida, and
Michigan." Unaffected by the argument that even equity
should not decide questions of public policy, these courts
have applied the equitable doctrine that no wrongdoer
should benefit from his wrong, and have found that a sub-
stantial benefit does accrue to the tenant by the entireties
who feloniously kills his co-tenant. Beginning with the
premise that the right of survivorship does not include the
right of homicide, it has been said:
"... that merely outliving the wife does not satisfy
the conditions imposed by the common law relative to
estates by entirety so that the survivor may take all.
One must not only be a survivor in fact but also a sur-
"
6In Re Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. St. 203, 32 A. 637 (1895). The use
of this case by the court In the Wyckoff case, ibid, 256, was as follows:
"Counsel for the vendee argues that ... the court should, under its
general equity powers, create a constructive trust to prevent petitioner
from obtaining any benefit whatsoever as the result of his crime.
"While this proposal had a supporter in Justice Kephart, . . . the
same argument had been rejected by the court in Carpenter's Estate."
The Slayer's Act, ibid, also had the effect of avoiding the result of the
Carpenter case. See Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann. (1955 Supp.), Tit. 20, Sec.
3443, which reads:
"The slayer shall be deemed to have predeceased the decedent as
to property which would have passed from the decedent or his estate
to the slayer under the statutes of descent and distribution . . ."
17 PA. CONST., Art. 1, See. 19: "No attainder shall work . . . forfeiture of
estate to the Commonwealth." Professor Tiffany was apparently in accord
with the view that the killer's right of survivorship should remain undis-
turbed. He said:
"Where the death of one spouse has been feloniously effected by the
other, it seems to be generally held that there is no right of survivor-
ship. It would seem, however, that the right of survivorship would
depend upon the fact and not the manner of the other tenant's death."
2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed., 1939), See. 430, 219.
Is The earliest case in which this result was reached was Barnett v. Couey,
224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S. W. 2d 757 (1930). The later cases are: Grose v.
Holland, 357 Mo. 874, 211 S. W. 2d 464 (1948) ; Ashwood v. Patterson, 49
So. 2d 848 (Fla., 1951) ; Hogan v. Martin, 52 So. 2d 806 (Fla., 1951);
Cowan v. Pleasant, 263 S. W. 2d 494 (Ky., 1953) ; Budwit v. Herr, 339 Mich.
265, 63 N. W. 2d 841 (1954).
1957]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
vivor in contemplation of law. Indispensible is the pre-
requisite that the decease must be in the ordinary
course of events and subject only to the vicissitudes of
life. The killer can assert no right of complete owner-
ship as survivor.'"19
Reasoning from that point with the constructive trust in
mind, it is not difficult for the equity court to say that the
additional benefits of sole ownership which the killer
acquires are benefits unjustly acquired, and that although
no new property is acquired, the trust ought to be imposed
to prevent the unjust enrichment.20
In Barnett v. Couey and Grose v. Holland,2 the first two
cases to impose the trust over half the property, it was
easy for the Missouri courts to arrive at their conclusion.
The heirs of the victim only asked for a constructive trust
over half the property, and all that was sought was granted.
Justifying this result, and in avoidance of the forfeiture
of property for conviction of crime problem, the courts, in
these cases declared that the felonious homicide, like
divorce, terminated the marital status, and like divorce,
created a tenancy in common. The constructive trust, there-
fore, was felt to be proper in being imposed upon only half
the estate. The next case to grant this relief was the Florida
case of Ashwood v. Patterson.22 Although each of the par-
ties argued for the entire property, the killer had committed
suicide immediately after inflicting the death blow, and
the facts were such that the court did not know who died
first. The court felt that it would therefore be proper to
split the property and granted a constructive trust over
half, citing and following the approach of the Barnett and
Grose cases. Six months later, though, the Florida court
was again faced with the uxorcide problem, and even
though the killer was still alive, the court followed the
Barnett v. Couey, ibid, 761.
20 Note for example the following passage from Grose v. Holland, supra,
n. 18, 466 et seq.:
"When William Edgar Holland murdered his wife he did acquire
a practical, substantial benefit by that act. Prior to that murder, both
he and his wife were each entitled to enjoy the whole, and each had
a chance of survivorship and consequent acquisition of the whole as a
tenant in severalty. The practical benefit that he acquired by the death
of his wife does satisfy the conditions Imposed by the common law rela-
tive to estate by entirety so -that the survivor may take all. One must
not only be a survivor in fact but also a survivor in contemplation of
law. Indispensible is the prerequisite that decease must be in the ordi-
nary course of events and subject only to the vicissitudes of life. The
killer can assert no right to complete ownership as survivor. Equity





Ashwood case in a 4 to 2 decision.2 , The concept of the
marriage being terminated by the felonious act is an appeal-
ing one, and was followed by the two later cases presented
with the problem.24
The difficulty with the theory, however, is this: if, in
fact, the act does dissolve the marital status, then the legal
title itself would be converted into a tenancy in common,
just as it is in the case of divorce.25 And if the legal title
is thus affected, then there is an adequate remedy at law in
the heirs of the victim, and the constructive trust, being
unnecessary, should be denied on that basis. But, if it is
to be said that the marriage is dissolved only in equity and
not at law, then the courts which impose this relief are
themselves creating a fiction while they profess to be reduc-
ing the situation to its actual facts which extinguish the
entity basis of the joint ownership.2"
TRUST IMPOSED UPON ENTIR PRoPERTY
Following the New York case of Van Alstyne v. Tuffy,27
the jurisdictions of Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Dela-
ware,"8 have decided that the proper relief is a constructive
trust upon the whole of the property. The right of survivor-
ship, though vested in both of the spouses, is viewed by
these courts as being subjected to the contingency of
unpredictable divesture, i.e., unpredictable in the ordinary
course of life. Since no one could have forseen who would
have been the survivor if the felonious killing had not
occurred, the doubt is merely resolved against the wrong-
doer. Because it is the killer, himself, who has created this
2 Hogan v. Martin, supra, n. 18.
21 Cowan v. Pleasant and Budwit v. Herr, ibid. The later case affirmed
a lower court decision by a split (4-4) court, the dissenting Judges taking
the view that no trust at all ought to be imposed.
2 See Reed v. Reed, 109 Md. 690, 72 A. 414 (1909).
"As an Illustration of how these cases have purported to abandon fiction
for reality, see Grose v. Holland, supra, n. 18, 466:
"If two tenants by entirety are divorced, the legal fiction is destroyed
and the former husband and wife become tenants in common. . . . If
the fiction of complete ownership in each Is not destroyed, one or the
other must take all the estate."
In Cowan v. Pleasant, supra, n. 18, 496, the court recognized that the method
by which their result was obtained was not theoretically sound:
"No useful purpose would be served by attempting to reconcile our
conclusion In this case with, or to distinguish it from, the finely spun
legalistic theories expressed In the opinions of the courts holding that
the heirs of either the wrongdoer, or those of the one murdered, take
all of the property when it Is held under a tenancy by the entireties."
27103 Misc. Rep. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918).
2 Diamond v. Ganci, 328 Mass. 315, 103 N. E. 2d 716 (1952) ; Neiman v.
Hurff, 11 N. J. 55, 93 A. 2d 345 (1952) ; Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. 122,
80 A. 2d 923 (1951).
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doubt, these courts feel that it is not too much of an im-
position upon him to resolve this against him. The respec-
tive life expectancies of the parties are held to be imma-
terial.2 9 The Restatement of Restitution is in accord with
their view:
"The rule . . . is based upon the principle that
although the murderer will not be deprived of prop-
erty to which he would otherwise be entitled, he will
not be entitled to profit by the murder; and where it is
doubtful whether or not he would have had an interest
if he had not committed the murder, the chances are
resolved against him. Thus, if the murderer had an in-
terest in property contingent upon his surviving his
victim, he is not entitled to keep the property, since
although he survives the victim he does so as a result
of the murder, and but for the murder he might have
predeceased the victim, in which case he would not
have been entitled to the property. It is immaterial
that because of their respective ages, state of health or
the like, it is probable that the murderer would have
been the survivor."30
No provision was made for any of the income to go to the
killer for his life in the Van Alstyne case." This is perhaps
explainable by the fact that the defendant there did not
raise the question of unconstitutional forfeiture. In the
later cases, the killers were not so careless, and the consti-
tutional shield was raised. The courts averted the difficulty,
however, by saying that if the presumption of the victim
Neiman v. Hurff, ibid, 348, exemplifies this feeling:
"Inasmuch as the husband by his wrongful act has prevented the
determination in the natural course of events of whether he or his wife
would survive, it is not inequitable to presume that the decedent
would have survived the wrongdoer. In this situation there is no justi-
fication for determining survivorship according to the mathematical
life expectancies of the decedent and her murderer. The wrongdoer,
having prevented the natural ascertainment of the answer to the ques-
tion of survivorship, should not be permitted to avail himself of
mortality tables which may have no applicability as between him and
the decedent in respect to their respective Individual possibilities of
survivorship. Equity therefore conclusively presumes for the purpose
of working out justice that the decedent would have survived the
wrongdoer. In no other way can complete justice be done and the
criminal prevented from profiting through his crime."
See also Colton v. Wade, ibid, 926:
"... I do not believe the question of life expectancies is material
in view of the fact that the survivor's wrongful conduct prevented the
natural ascertainment of the surviving tenant. Certainly the doubt
should be resolved against the wrongdoer."
9 RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937), Sec. 188, Comment a.
See 4 ScowT, TRUSTS (2d ed., 1956), Sec. 493.2, 3206.
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outliving the killer were logically extended, then the killer
ought to be entitled to his share of the income from the
property as though both spouses were alive. By granting
this concession, the later courts felt themselves able to say
that nothing which belonged to the killer before the murder
was taken from him, and that only that which has been
unjustly gained is lost, thereby attempting to answer the
argument that this relief constitutes a forfeiture of property
worked by conviction of crime. 2
Although it appears sound at first glance, the proposition
that nothing is forfeited by the killer if given a share of
the income is not entirely correct. A co-tenant has the right
to share possession, and this is taken from the killer by
those courts which only grant him a life interest in the
profits. Furthermore, even though there is no right of in-
dividual alienation in each of the tenants by the entireties,
there is the right to join with the other in the conveyance
of the property. This, too, is taken from the killer by those
courts.
TRUST FLEXIBLY APPLIED
The fourth method of dealing with the constructive trust
problem, and the third manner in which the equity courts
have tried to prevent the unjust enrichment of the wrong-
doer, is to base the relief upon the life expectancies of the
parties at the time of the felonious killing. The adherents
to this method assume that the probabilities represented by
the mortality tables used by courts are what would have
2As was said in Colton v. Wade, supra, n. 28, 926:
"My determinatiOn to impress a trust does not, realistically, con-
stitute a forfeiture of the defendant's estate because it merely prevents
her from obtaining more 'rights in fact' than she had prior to her
wrongful act. Until her wrongful act she merely was entitled to share
the net income with her husband. The possibility that she would have
the exclusive interest by survivorship was just that - a possibility.
To resolve against her 'the doubt concerning this possibility does not
work a forfeiture of any estate."
If the killing occurs in a state which allows the husband the full income
from property held by the entireties, and the victim is the wife, then the
killer is allowed the full income for life. Diamond v. Ganci, supra, n.
28, 718:
"Before the wife's death the defendant had enjoyed a life interest
with the exclusive right to rents and profits. This he did not forfeit
by the murder."
In such a jurisdiction, if the wife were the killer, the constructive trust
would be imposed upon the entire property without the necessity of making
any allowance for income. It is for this reason that the writer feels that
Professor Scott erred in distinguishing, as a matter of classification,
between those cases which make allowance for income and those which do
not. 4 SCOTT, TaUsTs (2d ed., 1956), Sec. 493.2, 3204 et 86q. See also, note
12 of this comment.
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actually happened if the killing had not occurred. The trust
is applied, therefore, to give the spouse with the shorter life
expectancy his (or her) distributive share of the income,
and to give the rest to the other. Where the victim has a
shorter life expectancy than the killer, the court gives his
heirs a constructive trust upon his share of the profits for
his normal life expectancy." But where the victim has a
longer life expectancy than the killer, his heirs are given
a constructive trust upon the entire property, except for
the killer's interest in the income.34
Professor Bogert is in accord with this method of
approaching the problem. He says:
"Thus, if H and W are tenants by the entirety, H
has an expectancy of ten years and W of fifteen years,
and H murders W, an equitable result would be that H
should be declared a constructive trustee of an estate
for ten years in half the property and of the fee in the
whole property, subject to an estate for ten years in
half of the property in H. Had the murder not oc-
curred, for ten years the profits would have been
shared equally, and then, in all probability, W would
have acquired the fee in severalty. W's innocent suc-
cessors should get from H this ten-year interest in half
the estate and the fee, subject to an estate for ten years
in H in one-half the property. If the murdered, H, had
a greater expectation than W, then the constructive
trust should extend only to a half interest in the prop-
erty for the period of W's expectancy at the time of her
death." 5
Sherman v. Weber, 113 N. J. Eq. 451, 167 A. 517 (1933). The wife was
forty and the husband-killer thirty-six at the time of the killing. In achiev-
ing its result, the court said:
"Equity will refuse to permit the husband, or those who claim
through him, to profit by the murder and will do justice by restoring
the property rights, as nearly as may be, as they were at the time the
husband slew his wife, adjudging that because of the act through
which the husband became seized of the fee, he was trustee thereof for
the interest his wife would have had, had he permitted her to live her
normal expectancy of life, and that while the title in fee was vested in
the husband and passed under his will to the defendants, they hold it
subject to such trust."
The flexible view which this court took was overruled by Neiman v. Hurff,
supra, n. 28. See the quoted text from that case in n. 29.
"Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S. E. 188, 51 A. L. R. 1100 (1927).
In reciting the facts essential to the case, the court said, at page 188 et seq.:
"At the time of the death of said Ida Bryant she was in good health,
was younger than her husband, was free from dissipation, while her
husband was addicted to the use of strong drink, and under the mor-
tuary table she had a longer expectancy of life than her husband."
I3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES (2d ed., 1946), Sec. 478, 57.
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Such a position, however, attempts to find certainty in
the adjustment of the rights of the parties where none
exists. Mortality tables are based upon statistical projec-
tion and merely reflect an over-all pattern; they are useless
if attempted to be used for individual predictability. No
one can forecast another person's being run over by an
automobile, and yet these advocates say that they are
satisfied that both parties would live their normal life ex-
pectancies. What if the victim was younger, with a longer
life expectancy, but the killer, in fact, lives far beyond the
age at which the mortality tables say he should have died?
Or how about the cases in which the killer has committed
suicide immediately after the death of the victim? Should
the killer who terminated his own life be given the artificial
benefit of his life expectancy but for his suicide? The dif-
ferences in life expectancies which vary with the strain
of different employments and social habits are also not fac-
tors in an over-all mortality table; but even if they were,
those considerations are so subjective as to be unworkable
as standards for a court of equity to decide cases upon.8s
MARYLAND BACKGROUND
No case has been decided by the Court of Appeals on
this particular point. One case, however, has indicated the
possible result toward which this state may be inclined.
In the case of Price v. Hitaffer,7 the Court was presented
with the situation in which a husband killed his wife and
immediately committed suicide. Both spouses died inte-
state, and the administrators of their respective estates
clashed on the issues of (1) whether, as a matter of public
policy, a murdering husband ought to be denied his statu-
tory heirship, and (2) whether the denial of the right of
inheritance constitutes a forfeiture of property worked by
conviction of crime as prohibited by Article Twenty-seven
of the Declaration of Rights. The Court affirmed an
Orphan's Court affirmative answer to the first, and negative
answer to the second, and denied the killer his right of
In the Bryant case, supra, n. 34, the court apparently took the subjective
factors into consideration. There it was easy because the killer was both
intemperate and older. But suppose one spouse is older and the other is
socially intemperate? Can the varying degree of age and social habits be
added together and considered in one case? Of course not. Yet, if the
mortality tables alone are used, the result is purely artificial. The ages of
the spouses could be such, that the variation in their life expectancies is a
matter of days, and this small difference would decide whether the victim
received a life-expectancy interest in the income only or the fee.
87164 Md. 505, 165 A. 470 (1933).
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inheritance from the victim, thus also disinheriting all who
claimed as heirs through the murderer.
The public policy considerations in the questions of in-
heritance and survivorship are greatly similar. The denial
of either in the case of murder, prevents the unjust enrich-
ment of a wrongdoer. Admittedly, there is a difference in
that the former is an acquisition of property, while the
latter is merely an acquisition of the additional property
rights incidental to sole ownership, but in both situations
there is the problem of an unjust enrichment resulting from
the wrongful act. The Court of Appeals had little difficulty
in denying the right of inheritance on this basis:
"It is impossible to conceive that the maxims of the
common law now under consideration, and which we
are asked to apply, are inconsistent with or repugnant
to the spirit and principles of republican institutions,
whose strength lies in the virtue and integrity of the
citizen to correct the morals and protect the reputa-
tion, rights, and property of individuals, by denying
the right of a murderer to enrich himself by taking any
part of his victim's estate. '3
In one respect, it was even a more difficult task to apply the
principle of public policy in the Price case than it would be
in the case of survivorship. The husband's heirship is a
right granted by statute and not by common law. Where
the very right upon which the wrongdoer bases his claim
is a legislature-created one, it should be easier for a court
to fall prey to the argument of the Bledsoe"9 case that
matters of public policy are within the domain of the legis-
lature and not the courts. But, almost as if the very lan-
guage of the Bledsoe case were anticipated, the Court re-
jected similar holdings in heirship cases, and said:
"It may be observed, however, that most, if not all,
rest upon the argument that courts are powerless to
read unambiguous words of the statute in conjunction
with universally accepted moral and equitable prin-
ciples without infringing the domain of legislative
action, even though such interpretation result in sanc-
tioning the enrichment of the perpetrator of the most
heinous murder from the estate of his victim. Suffice
it to say that we decline to follow the reasoning sup-
porting any interpretation fraught with consequences
Ibid, 510.
133 N. E. 2d 887 (Ind., 1956), dis. op. 894.
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so pernicious and so abhorrent to the sense of justice,
equity, and morality entertained by what we are
pleased to believe is the overwhelming majority of
thoughtful and moral people, but prefer to give expres-
sion and adherence to the principles and reasoning so
forcibly presented by those courts who have in the past
adopted the views herein expressed."4
In support of its position, the Court in the Price case cited
as "lucid and convincing",4 the case of Bryant v. Bryant,4'
the North Carolina case which imposed a constructive trust
upon the whole of the property held in tenancy by the en-
tireties for the benefit of the victim's heirs except for one-
half the income, but did so partly on the basis of the wife-
victim having a longer life expectancy than her murderer-
spouse. Since the Price case made no mention of the
relative ages of the spouses in the determination of the in-
heritance problem, however, it would appear that relative
life expectancies but for the murder, are immaterial in
Maryland, and that the Bryant case was approved more for
its theory that a constructive trust was proper upon the
entire property to prevent the unjust enrichment of a
wrongdoer, than its consideration of the ages of the spouses.
However, the opinion in the Price case should not be con-
sidered as being of too much significance as to what a fair
determination of the rights of the parties in a survivorship
case would be. Most of the cases on the survivorship prob-
lem have been decided since the Price case, including all
but one of those which have imposed the constructive trust
on half of the property, and the Court in the Price case had
little survivorship authority from which it could make its
choice. More significant than trying to guess what the
Court of Appeals will consider an equitable adjustment,
is the near certainty that it will consider this principle of
public policy preventing the wrongdoer from benefiting
from his wrong a binding authority.
The Price case was also the only Maryland case to ever
construe Article Twenty-seven of the Declaration of Rights,
the Maryland forfeiture provision, which reads:
"That no conviction shall work corruption of blood
or forfeiture of estate."
The Court merely held that an heir's expectancy is not a
property right and that there was nothing upon which this





Constitutional provision could operate. Assuming that the
correct view is that it is inevitable that some property
rights be relinquished by the killer when the constructive
trust is imposed in the survivorship cases, does it neces-
sarily follow that Article Twenty-seven is violated? The
courts which have ruled on this issue have assumed, with-
out giving thought to the constitution as a public enact-
ment with a purpose, that the answer would be yes. But
the brevity of their discussions belie a literal interpretation
of the provision. The Court of Appeals in the Price case,
however, hinted at the true consideration of the problem
when it described Article Twenty-seven as, ".... a constitu-
tional declaration against forfeiture for a general convic-
tion of crime."48
At common law, when a man was convicted of any
serious crime, the conviction in and of itself worked a for-
feiture to the king of all the personalty which the con-
victed criminal owned." For conviction of treason, a simi-
lar result was obtained as to realty and leasehold estates.45
The theory behind this doctrine was that the right of
ownership of property was a social right gained by the in-
dividual when he entered into the social contract with the
king to form an organized society. Because of his breach of
the social contract, the social right itself was lost.4" Since
the basis of the forfeiture was a wrong to the state, it
follows that the proof of the wrong to the state was essen-
tial. Only conviction can establish the wrong against the
state, for that is the function of a criminal prosecution, and
so conviction was a necessary element to the forfeiture.47
" Price v. Hitaffer, supra, n. 37, 508.
"4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARMS (Lewls's ed., 1900), 1763 (*386):
"The forfeiture of goods and chattels accrues in every one of the
higher kinds of offense: in high treason or misprison thereof, petit
treason, felonies of all sorts, whether clergyable or not .... standing
mute, and the above-mentioned offenses of striking, etc., in Westminster
hall."4 Ibid, 1760 (0381):
"By attainder in high treason a man forfeits to the king all his lands
and tenements of inheritance, whether fee-simple or fee-tail, and all
his rights of entry on lands or tenements which he had at the time of
the offense committed, or at any time afterwards, to be forever vested
in the crown; and also the profits of all lands and tenements which he
had in his own right for life or years, so long as such interest shall
subsist."
Ibid, 382.
"See Paginton and Huet's case, Godholt 267, 78 Eng. Rep. 156 (1609).
See also the statement by Mr. Justice Story:
".... no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired
by the crown, by the mere commission of the offence; but the right
attached only by conviction of the offender. The necessary result was,
that in every case where the crown sought to recover such goods and
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The technical doctrine of forfeiture of property worked
by conviction of crime was part of the early law of Mary-
land. In 1775, in the case of Thomas's Lessee v. Hamilton,"8
the Court of Appeals reversed a refusal by the Provincial
Court to apply the doctrine. The case involved an action
of ejectment. Plaintiff claimed title through a lease from
the Lord Proprietary. Defendant claimed title through an
earlier lease from the Lord Proprietary to George Talbot.
Upon the assertion of defendant's prior title, plaintiff in-
troduced into evidence the record of conviction of Talbot in
Virginia for stabbing a man. The Court of Appeals held
that the conviction worked a forfeiture of Talbot's title
back to the Lord Proprietary who stood in the same posi-
tion in the colonies as did the king in the mother country.
When Article Twenty-seven of the Declaration of Rights
was enacted, this doctrine was in effect and considered a
definite evil which the people sought to remedy.
But the imposition of the constructive trust is on an
entirely different basis. The theory upon which it is based
is that of an individual wrong, independent of the wrong
to the state; and the property rights which are lost are
relinquished to the estate of the person wronged. Most
significant, therefore, is the fact that the criminal convic-
tion in the case of the imposition of the constructive trust is
entirely immaterial, and the forfeiture resulting from the
constructive trust is not worked by the conviction at all.
In the Van Alstyne 9 case, the trust was imposed where the
murderer committed suicide immediately after the killing
and could not have been convicted of the wrong against the
state. In New Jersey, the record of the criminal conviction,
even if one is obtained, could not be introduced into evi-
dence in a suit to impose the constructive trust, and yet the
trust will be imposed if the fact of the killing is established
by outside proof of witnesses, confessions, etc.50
chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right, by producing the
record of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of the
common law, the offender's right was not divested, until the conviction."
The Palmyra, 12 Wheat. 1, 14 (U. S. 1827).
Is1 H. & Mc. 190 (Md., 1755).
' 
9 Van Alstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. Rep. 455, 169 N. Y. S. 173 (1918).
10 Sorbello v. Mangino, 108 N. J. Eq. 292, 155 A. 6 (1931), refused to apply
any trust where the only proof of the killing was the killer's record of con-
viction. But see Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N. J. 55, 93 A. 2d 345 (1952), which
imposed the full trust where the killing was established by outside proof,




The idea of the constructive trust being imposed upon
the entire property is an appealing one because it satisfies
our desire to reap vengeance against the killer. There are,
however, mitigating circumstances which can arise, and
which would make either this view or its antithesis seem
unfair. Suppose, for example, the killer was insane when
he took the life of his spouse?"' Or, suppose the death was
brought about by involuntary manslaughter? Or, suppose
that the property was originally the killer's and he trans-
ferred it to both himself and his wife through a straw man
long before he decided to murder her? In all these situa-
tions, it would be difficult to give the major part of the prop-
erty to either spouse.
In none of the cases herein discussed were these or
similar mitigating circumstances elaborated upon or em-
ployed as factors in the determination of the case. Each of
the various jurisdictions dealing with the problem has by
strong judicial pronouncement (or by statute) adopted one
of the views as its own particular solution, apparently
oblivious of the difficulties which may later have to be
faced. If the statement of a particular rule is to be taken
as governing all future cases, regardless of their facts (or
if a statutory rule is adopted), an element of certainty is
injected into the law; but, the question arises as to whether
this is an area of the law in which predictability should be
an influential consideration. It is submitted that the in-
dividual equities of a given case should be more important
than the blind adoption for all purposes of any one of the
aforementioned views, and that the courts of this state
should adopt the more realistic approach of the common
law process, the case-by-case development of the law, un-
hampered by the artificial rigidities which any one of the
views would require. As each case presents its unique
factual difficulties, therefore, the courts should take them
into consideration and decide whether all the property
should go to either of the spouses, or whether justice could
best be served by splitting the property in half. The extent
to which the enrichment is unjust, taking into consideration
all the mitigating circumstances involved, should be the
extent to which the constructive trust device is applied.
& See Recent Decision, Anderson v. Grasberg, 78 N. W. 2d 450 (Minn.,
1956), 17 Md. L. Rev. 89, infra.
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